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Abstract
This paper applies cooperative game theory to develop a model for food safety governance and analyzes the process of which the 
government, the market and the third sector take party in food safety governance and achieve game balance. The research result 
is that the performance improvement of food safety governance should be based on the cooperative mechanism of which 
government, market, and the third sector. Therefore, it is essential for us to take some measures to establish a coordinate 
mechanism of which the government, the market, and the third sector participate in the food safety governance. 
© 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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Since the 1990s, China’s food industry growing rapidly. The total output of meat, aquatic products, and sugar 
increased by 205.19 per cent, 320.36 per cent, 69.92 per cent in 2009 respectively more than that of the 1990[1]. The 
food industry has become an important pillar industry in China. However, the serious incidents of food safety have 
occurred frequently. 95.8 per cent of urban consumers and 94.5 per cent of rural consumers concerned about food 
safety issues in 2008[2]. This background leads to an urgent study on food safety issues. Many scholars have put 
forth different points of view on the relationship between the protagonist’s behavior and food safety. The majority of 
food in market are not only experience goods but also credence goods (Caswell and Padberg, 1992) [3], food 
suppliers will take adverse selection as the optimal strategy in the absence of third-party monitoring mechanism.
Obviously, government is important manager(Zhou De-yi, Yang Hai-juanˈ2002˗Wang Xiu-qingˈ2002) [4-5]
But the government mechanism always focuses on the construction of laws and standards of food safety, while 
neglects the implementation cost of specific regulations or standards and the benefit game between different 
protagonists in the market; and it leads to government failure˄Henson and Caswell, 1999˅
.
[6]
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. Many overseas 
researchers believed that market mechanism and government mechanism have their faulty, and thought that food 
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safety governance should concern inter action of the different protagonists: government's regulatory, consumer’s 
participation, producer’s obedience, and so on (Henson, et a1, 2001) [7].
The above researches are theoretical basis of this paper. But in china, the study on food safety began in the late 
1990s. The majority of domestic literatures analyzed the food safety issues from the point of view on the 
relationship between the government and the market, and emphasized the impacts of the government and the market 
on food safety, but ignored the role of social forces, and “the majority of researches are qualitative” [8]. Our view is 
that food suppliers, government, and food industry association in modern market economy are the three protagonists
affecting food safety, and their cooperative behavior in production, circulation, and consumption impact directly on 
the level of food safety. So, food safety should be understood on the base of the cooperative relationship of among 
the government, the food suppliers, and the social intermediary organizations. 
2. MODEL
Based on the previous studies, this 
paper established a model for multipartite participation in food safety governance, and tries to reveal the effective 
way to enhance the performer of food safety governance.
2.1 Benefits distribution model
In the real market environment, the protagonists are limited rationality. “Their behavioural change are slow 
evolution rather than rapid learning or adjustment, therefore, we can simulation the process by the copy dynamic 
mechanism of biology evolution, that is the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)” [9]
(1, 2,3, , )H n 
.When food safety problem 
appearances, government, food suppliers and food industry association play games with each other continuously for 
their rights and interests in the market. So, we can construct a dynamic game model for the cooperate behavior of 
protagonist’s food safety governance based on evolutionary game theory. We suppose that player’s game sets 
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is random player i’s  evolutionary stable strategy, and his expected payoff of ESS more 
than that of other strategies. Even if other player not choose ESS, player i’s expected income of ESS more than that 
of other strategies. That is 
Where, 
( ) ( )
'
i i
i iC CG G , and then,
( ) ( ) (1) ( 1) ( 1) ( )
1 1 1( , ( , , , , , ))
i i i i n
i i i i i nE C C C C CG G G G G G
 
  t 
( ) ( ) (1) ( 1) ( 1) ( )
1 1 1( , ( , , , , , ))
i i i i n
i i i i i nE C C C C CG G G G G G
 
     ( ) ( ) (1) ( 1) ( 1) ( )1' ' 1 1( , ( , , , , , ))i i i i ni i i i i nE C C C C CG G G G G G   
Implies
( ) ( ) (1) ( 1) ( 1) ( )
2 1 1( , ( , , , , , ))
i i i i n
i i i i i nE C C C C CG G G G G G
 
  !  ( ) ( ) (1) ( 1) ( 1) ( )2' ' 1 1( , ( , , , , , ))i i i i ni i i i i nE C C C C CG G G G G G   
Copy dynamic equation is the key of game analysis. When player i choose C(i)Gi
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Where, E(i)Gi refers to player i’s expected income. E(i) refers to player i’s total expected income in the entire game, 
and C(i*)Gi the equilibrium point of evolutionary stable strategy.
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Gw w , the slope is negative. The communication between game players will be stopped when they 
achieve the point of evolutionary stable strategy. Game players, who are limited rationality man, can achieve Nash 
equilibrium eventually through communication.
2.2The evolutionary game model of tripartite benefits distribution: government, industry associations, and 
food supplies
For the convenience of analysis, we propose following assumptions: 
(1) There are three protagonists in food market: G refers to government whose goal is the pursuit of public 
interest; Y refers to food industry association whose goal is the pursuit of some public benefits; R refers to food 
suppliers whose goal is the pursuit of private interests. They are all limited rationality economical men. (2) Each 
player has two strategies. Food suppliers supply safety food or unsafe food. The government chooses active 
supervision or passive supervision. Food industry association actively protect industry reputation or passively.
According to the assumption (2), we can deduce player’s randomly strategy choices, and can be shown as 
Tab.1. Game players are limited rationality economical men. So, they do not choose the optimal strategy based on 
completely rational assumption at beginning of the game. We assume that the probability of player G choosing 
option 1 is p1, and then, his probability of choosing option 2 is 1-p1.The same as player G, the probability of player 
Y choosing option 1 is p2, and then, his probability of choosing option 2 is 1- p2; the probability of player R
choosing option 1 is p3, and then, his probability of choosing option 2 is 1-p3
When R chooses the option 2˖
.When the game beginning, one player 
may meet the other two players who choose the same strategies or the different strategies. One player’s payoff 
depends on not only his own strategy decision, but also the other two player’s strategy decision. Each player’s 
payoff matrix as shown Tab.2.
(1, 1, 2) refers to the low payoff, that is, the worst outcome of the game between government, industry 
associations, and food suppliers. It occurs if government makes the conflict laws or regulations based on its own 
interests, the interests of industry associations are inconsistent with the public interest, and food enterprises affected 
by multiple regulations. Now, China’s food safety facing two major obstacles: one is legal barriers, another is 
institutional barriers. The two obstacles are the low payoffs. Legal barriers including the lag in the construction of 
food safety laws, the lack of harmony in food safety standards, and inadequate supervision, and so on. Institutional 
barriers including too much government oriented, food safety regulated by multi sectors, the neglect of the function 
of industry associations in food safety management.
(1, 2, 4) refers to the high payoff, that is, the best outcome of the game between government, industry 
associations, and food suppliers. It means that government provides the better institutional environment for 
producing safety food; industry associations help food suppliers improve their management level, the operation of 
food suppliers running under a perfect legal system. On the other word, each of them obtains the maximizing 
interesting from the stability and coordination environment. But, each of players does not know the optimal 
strategies because he is limited rationality economical man. So, system should be perfected based on the common 
effort of government, industry associations, and food suppliers.
Tab.1 The payoff matrix of three-player
˄a1ˈa2ˈa3˅ ˄b1ˈb2ˈb3˅
˄c1ˈc2ˈc3˅ ˄d1ˈd2ˈd3˅
Y
option 1 option 2
option 1
option 1
G
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Tab.2 The payoff matrix in the case
When R chooses option 1, matrix 1 is
                      
When R chooses option 2, matrix 2 is
                       
When the player G choose option 1, then
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w w . We can obtain the point (c*), that is, the player G’s evolutionary sable 
strategy. Based on the above analysis, player Y’s copy dynamic equation is:
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The player R’s copy dynamic equation is:
˄1ˈ1ˈ4˅ ˄1ˈ3ˈ3˅
˄2ˈ1ˈ4˅ ˄2ˈ3ˈ4˅
Y
option 1 option 2
option 1
option 1
G
˄s1ˈs2ˈs3˅ ˄z1ˈz2ˈz3˅
˄y1ˈy2ˈy3˅ ˄m1ˈm2ˈm3˅
Y
option 1 option 2
option 1
option 1
G
˄1ˈ1ˈ2˅ ˄1ˈ3ˈ2˅
˄1ˈ1ˈ2˅ ˄2ˈ3ˈ2˅
Y
option 1 option 2
option 1
option 1
G
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2.3 The solution of ESS equilibrium
We first analyze the copy dynamic equation of two-player game, evolutionary stable strategy and its equilibrium. 
Secondly, we analyze the third player’s evolutionary stable strategy, and then calculate three-player’s the solution of
ESS. Therefore, we suppose that the player R chooses option 1, and then, three-player game turn into two-player 
game. Its payoff matrix is as shown Tab.3.
Tab.3 The payoff matrix after predigestion 
                                    
The player G’s copy dynamic equations are:
( ) 1 1 ( ) 1 1
1 2 2 2 2 2(1 ) 1, (1 ) 2
G GE p a p b E p c p d        
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1 1 14 2 ,
G pE p p p
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So, the player G’s ESS equilibrium solution is 
1* 0p  .The player Y’s copy dynamic equation is:
( ) 2 2 ( ) 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1(1 ) 1, (1 ) 3
Y YE p a p c E p b p d        
( ) ( ) ( ) 22
2 1 2 2 2 2 2(1 ) 3 2 , 2 2
G Y Y pE p E p E p p p
k
w      w
                                                                     (13)
So, the player Y’s ESS equilibrium solution is
2* 0p  .From the above analysis , as the limited rationality 
economical men, although player G and player Y can not attain the optimal strategy at the beginning of the game, 
they can attain the game equilibrium through repeated games, mutual communication, and decision adjusting. That 
is, player G and player Y all choose option 2.  For player R, obviously, if the one choose some strategy, the other 
two may obtain similar game equilibrium. After three-player game finished, equilibrium must be occurring, that is, 
G, Y, R all choose option 2, the solution is˄2ˈ3ˈ4˅.
3. CONCULTION
The development of modern market economy has made food supply chain become longer and longer. The 
number of stakeholders in the food supply chain increasing, and their behavior affects directly food safety. However, 
for the limited rationality, each stakeholder can not solve the problem of food safety by himself. In the process of 
food safety management, each stakeholder seeks the optimal strategy though trying error constantly, self-adjust and 
mutual learning. Based on the above model analysis, there is a solution which can make government, industry 
associations, and food suppliers achieve the point of game equilibrium.
It shows us that the efficiency of food safety governance depends on the cooperative behavior of government, 
industry associations, and food suppliers. It shows us that multipartite cooperative governance of food safety can set 
up learning organizations among the government, food industry associations and food suppliers, and stimulate the 
initiative of which the other social members participate in the food safety governance, and cause the high payoff of 
the game and produces a positive effect on the improvement of food safety. Therefore, it is essential for us to take 
some measures to establish a coordinate mechanism of which the government, the market, and the third sector 
participate in the food safety governance. These measures including change the model of government oriented in 
food safety management, and promote food supplier’s self discipline, construct the institutional environment of 
which the food industry associations involved in food safety management.
˄1ˈ1˅ ˄1ˈ3˅
˄1ˈ1˅ ˄2ˈ3˅
Y
option 1 option 2
option 1
option 1
G
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